Introduction
Because of the universally recognized de ciencies of state-owned enterprises compared to private enterprises, there is almost no controversy over the necessity to transform centralplanned economies into market economies. The controversy lies in how to perform the transition and the extent of the transition. This paper builds on a model of transition economy in which a Public Servant, i.e., a politician, with di erent objectives and under di erent political institutions, must decide how far to carry privatization and in what order to privatize.
Debates over privatization policies among economists usually focus on the sequencing problem, i.e., how to nd the optimal sequence of privatization so as to minimize the problems characterizing the transition period. The sequence suggested and practiced in these countries roughly follows the size of di erent sectors Li 1989; Blommesteine and Marrese ed. 1991: rapid privatization of small businesses rst; establishment of a social safety net; demonopolization; privatization of medium state-owned enterprises; and last, privatization of large state-owned enterprises.
Despite the heated discussions and various experiments over sequencing, there is virtually no theoretical work on sequencing. In particular, there is no formal model in the privatization literature that incorporates the in uence of politics on privatization policies. We need to remember that politicians choose the privatization policies. Therefore, it is important t o see what kind of policies a maximizing politician would choose under di erent political 3 institutions.
In this paper, we set up a model to test the rationale of the sequences suggested above by economists of central planned economies and to study what kind of sequence a Public Servant with di erent objectives would choose. Some features of the model, including the compensation scheme, are abstracted from the Chinese experience. We w ant to see what kind of sequence is optimal for a Public Servant in the context of a controlled privatization process. Section 2 introduces a two period model of a highly simpli ed transition economy.
Section 3 presents the analysis of the problem of the consumer, the rm, and the Public Servant respectively. T w o t ypes of Public Servants are considered: one who maximizes the surplus budget subject to the constraint o f s t a ying in o ce the Bureaucrat, and one who maximizes popularity consumer welfare subject to the constraint of a balanced budget the Populist. Section 4 contains the main results of the model: other things being equal, the Bureaucrat will privatize the sector rms with the least market power and the largest subsidy rst. The Populist will adopt the same policy, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high. Therefore, the result is quite robust to the speci cation of the politician's objectives. Also, we show that it can be relatively easier and faster to privatize in a less democratic society. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the limitations and possible extensions of the model and conclude the paper.
This concept is introduced later. It basically captures the competitiveness of the sector and the elasticity of the product. The higher the market power of a sector, the more it can raise the price above marginal cost. 4 
Setup and Basic Assumptions
This section presents a simpli ed two period model of a transition economy that consists of I consumers, N+1 sectors of rms, and a Public Servant.
Consumers have di erent utility functions and incomes, which are exogenously given. At time t, consumer i is rationed to a xed amount of products from the public sectors at xed prices. Because of the low prices and minimum amounts supplied, we assume that he buys all the quantities that are rationed to him. This assumption closely approximates the actual situations in many central planned economies. He uses the rest of his income to choose consumption bundles from the products of the private sectors to maximize his utility. The numeraire commodity is assumed to be already traded on the market by time t , 1.
It can be thought of as some nonperishable foodstu . privatize. Without loss of generality, w e assume sector k is picked. We can then study the characteristics of k and the in uence of its privatization on the changes in consumer welfare.
Assume that a rm lj in public sector j ful lls quota Q lj imposed by the Public Servant, and sells its output at a xed price P j , which is below the market-clearing price. This assumption re ects a basic feature of centrally planned economies, where prices are xed for historical reasons and re ect neither cost nor market demand y . Therefore, the total output of sector j is Q j = Q lj L j . For simplicity, assume the population in the economy is xed.
Therefore, we can assume that Q j and Q lj are xed as long as sector j remains public, since y There are cases when there is no demand for the output of certain goods at the state-set prices, mostly in the production sector. In these cases, privatization may actually decrease the prices or change the products to something demanded by the market. Since there is little ambiguity in the privatization of these sectors and consumers do not need to be compensated for their privatization, we assume that they are privatized already and hence do not focus our attention on these cases. 6 the quota is decided by rationing over the total population. Let C j be the cost function of any rm lj in sector j, since they are all identical. The following assumption simpli es the de nition of the market power index de ned and used in Section 3.
Assumption 2 All rms in the same sector have the same cost function:
C j : R 1 + ! R 1 + is di erentiable and monotonic, for j = 0 ; 1; ; N .
This assumption simpli es the de nition of the market power index After sector j is privatized, rm lj's objective becomes pro t maximization. Let lj be the rm's pro t function. It chooses the optimal output Q lj and sells it at the market-clearing price P j .
Let P j Q 1 ; :::; Q N be sector j's inverse demand function. To ensure the existence of a
Cournot equilibrium Novshek 1985, we need the following assumption, Assumption 3 P j Q is twice c ontinuously di erentiable, monotonic, and sastis es @P j Q @Q j + Q j @ 2 P j Q @Q 2 j 0, which requires the inverse demand function to be c oncave.
Note that the cost function of rm lj does not change before or after privatization. Here we implicitly assume that technology does not change. What is changed is the production quantity and price, which is adjusted for the purpose of pro t maximization. This implies that the objective functions of the rms change after privatization, but any e ciency gain occurs after the transition period z z Here we do not want t o m a k e ad hoc assumptions about the e ects of privatization on cost, e ciency, or quality.
In order to simplify the structure in the later part of the model, we assume that none of the products of the N sectors are substitutes for each other. They can be either independent or complements. Another way to think about this assumption is to group all the substitutes in the economy in the same sector and simplify them into one product by using marginal rates of substitution.
Assumption 4 @Q i @P j 0; 8i 6 = j. This is equivalent t o s a ying that the cross elasticity o f a n y t wo products " ij = , @q i @P j P j q i 0; 8i 6 = j, i; j = 1 ; 2; :::; n, which implies that the consumers' utility functions need to satisfy the following condition: @ 2 u i q @q i @q l 0; 8l = 1 ; :::; N.
We consider two t ypes of Public Servant. Either type knows the distribution of consumers' utility functions x and of share ownership, and the matrices of supply and demand elasticities of every product. The reason for this assumption is to see what would be his best policy if he has enough information. At a n y given time t, h e m a k es three decisions whether to continue privatizing, which sector to privatize, and how to compensate the consumers. In order to concentrate on the characteristics of the transition period, we neglect some other important functions of the government, such as public good provision, and assume that the Public Servant's only functions are privatization and compensation. We use the parameter d to characterize the political institutions, where d is the percentage of consumers he needs to satisfy in order to stay in o ce.
x But he does not know the exact utility function of each consumer. Public rm lj in sector j is given the quota Q lj . Assume each rm is given the same quota,
i.e., Q lj = Q kj , for all k;l. Suppose it can ful ll the quota and sell its output at the xed price P j . Then it will provide revenue or require subsidy in the amount B lj , where
After the rm is privatized, it becomes a pro t maximizer. It chooses its optimal output Q lj to maximize its pro t. The price of product j is determined by the total output of the sector, which depends on the decisions of the other identical rms in the same sector and the total output of other sectors. Note that by Assumption 1, consumers all have quasilinear utility functions, so the inverse demand functions exist. We use Cournot equilibrium analysis for the private rms' decisions.
Firm lj chooses the optimal output Q lj in order to max Q lj P j Q 1 ; :::; Q N Q lj , C j Q lj :
From Assumption 2, the second order condition for the above maximization problem is satis ed, so we only need to look at the rst order condition, which is,
5 , MC j = 0 :
9 Let MC j be the marginal cost of rms in sector j. Rearranging terms we get
where " jj is the own elasticity of demand at Q j , and " jh is the cross elasticity of demand between product j and product h. Since all rms of the same sector are identical, namely, they all have the same cost functions, the market share of rm lj equals the inverse of the number of rms in sector j, i.e.,
Call j rm lj's market power index, which also characterizes sector j's market power. Alternatively, the above equation can be expressed as P j = MC j 1, j ; which will be used later. Note that the market power index is quite general with regard to the degree of competitiveness in a sector. When L j = 1, the above formula becomes the monopoly pricing formula.
On the other hand, if L j ! 1 , the equilibrium converges to the competitive equilibrium Tirole 1988. Therefore, the market power index shows how m uch a sector can raise the price of its product above its marginal cost. It is inversely related to the number of rms in the sector and the elasticities of demand of the product.
The Consumer's Problem
In order to study the e ects of the privatization of a certain sector, say k, on the change of a consumer's utility, w e study his maximization problem in two arbitrarily chosen contiguous time periods, t-1 and t.
At time t-1, sectors 1, ..., k are in the public sector, ful lling quotas; sectors 0, k+1, ..., N are in the private sector, maximizing pro ts. Consumer i's rationed quantities of products 1 through k are q 1 , ..., q k , which are allocated equally to everybody in the economy. In reality, the allocations vary from person to person according to age, sex and other personal characteristics. Here, for simplicity of analysis, and also because we can not distinguish among individual consumers, we assume an equal allocation.
At time t, if another sector, say, sector k, is privatized, consumer i is given compensation where S k is the total revenue from the sale of sector k, j is the tax rate of sector j, and ij is consumer i's proportion of shares in sector j. F rom the budget constraint, consumer i's income comes from two sources: his exogenously given income y i , which can be interpreted as wage and other personal endowments, and his share of the after tax pro t from the private sector, P N j=k ij 1, j t j . His e ective income, y t i , with which he can choose his consumption bundle among products produced in the private sector, is total income less the expenditure on rationed products.
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Therefore, his indirect utility function is v i P t ; y t i = i P t + y t i ;
where i P t = i q 1 ; :::; q k,1 ; q t ik P t ; :::; q t iN P t , P N j=k P t j q t ij P t , and whereP t is the shorthand for the vector of all prices at time t. Since consumer i has quasi-linear utility function, his indirect utility function can be written in two parts, with e ective income separate from i P t , and the demand function is independent of income.
Consumer i's indirect utility function at time t-1 is obtained similarly. Since consumer i has one degree less freedom and less purchasing power at time t-1 compared to time t, his e ective income at time t-1 is y t,1
Then his indirect utility function at time t-1 is v i P t,1 ; y t,1 i = i P t,1 + y t,1 i ;
where i P t,1 = i q 1 ; ; q k ; q t,1 ik+1 P t,1 ; ; q t,1 iN P t,1 , P N j=0;k+1 P t,1 j q t,1 ij P t,1 . We can calculate the minimal amount of compensation for consumer i necessary to keep him on the same indi erence curve a s h e w as before sector k is privatized by equating his indirect utility function at time t to that at t-1, v i P t ; y t i = v i P t,1 ; y t,1 i ; i.e., i P t + y t i = i P t,1 + y t,1 i ; 12 Plugging in the de nition of y t i and y t,1 i from Eqn 2 and 3, and rearranging terms, we get the individual consumer's minimal compensation,
The rst two terms, the price e ect, are the change of his indirect utility due to price changes; the next two terms, the pro t e ect, show the consumer's income changes due to the changes in his after tax pro t shares, where P N j=k+1 ij 1 , j t,1 j , t j is the total change in i's shares of after tax pro ts in the old private sectors as a result of privatizing sector k, and ik S k , 1 , k t k is his total payment for his shares in the newly privatized sector less his share of the after-tax pro t in this sector. Note that the pro t e ect can be either positive or negative. So are the individual consumers' minimal compensations. This is an important expression in the later analysis of the Public Servant's problem. Figure 1 shows the consumer's consumption before and after privatization in a simple two-good economy. A t time t-1, sector 2 is private, while sector 1 is public. Since q 1 is the rationed amount, the consumer's consumption bundle q 1 ; q t,1 2 usually is not the tangency point. At time t, sector 1 is privatized. The price of product 1 goes up to the market clearing price P 1 , and the price of product 2 also changes. With the new price ratio and e ective income, the consumer maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint. For some consumers, the new consumption bundle can lie on a higher indi erence curve; for others, it can lie on a lower indi erence curve. The minimal compensation, T , shows the amount of transfer needed to get the consumer to the tangent point consumption bundle, 13 q t 1 ; q t 2 , on the previous indi erence curve. Note that it could be positive, zero or negative. The Public Servant is a highly simpli ed representation of the government. At a n y given time t, he decides whether to continue privatizing, and, if yes, what sectors to privatize and how to compensate the consumers. Assume at time t, his budget comes from three sources:
1 Revenue and subsidies from the public sectors, P k,1 j=1 B j ;
2 Revenue from the sale of the public sector k, S k ;
3 Taxes from the private sectors, P N j=k j t j . It would be interesting to understand the details of the sale process. But since it depends on the bargaining power of the seller and the buyers, the future pro tability of the rms and a n umber of other political considerations, we do not study these in this paper. Assume that the sale revenue has the following relationship with the after tax pro t, S k = 1 + k 1, k t k , where k 2 R 1 represents the di erence between the sale amount and the actual after tax pro t due to the bargaining power of the buyers and seller, political considerations or other factors.
One type of Public Servant, the Bureaucrat, has the objective function of maximizing the surplus budget, i.e., total budget less total consumer compensation, subject to the In the next section, we will analyse the decisions of both types of Public Servant and compare their optimal behavior.
Main Results and Discussion
To get the nal results about the Public Servant's optimal privatization policy, the rst step is to analyse how an individual consumer's minimal compensation changes with the di erent characteristics of a sector. Since the Public Servant does not know each individual's utility function, but knows the distribution of their utility functions, the second step is to get the minimal aggregate compensation from the distribution of utility functions and the political constraint, d. The third step is to derive the main results about the Public Servant's optimal privatization policy. Then we show some results on the e ects of political institutions on the privatization process.
Individual Consumer's Minimal Compensation
In order to study the Public Servant's decision, we need to know h o w an individual consumer's minimal compensation changes with the characteristics of sector k, k .
Proposition 1 When a sector k is privatized, and consumer i's share i n s e ctor k is sufciently small, then other things being constant, the minimal individual compensation increases with an increase in P t k , and with an increase in the market power of sector k, and vice versa. I.e., Intuitively, for a small shareholder or for somebody who does not hold any shares in the newly privatized sector, the price e ect dominates the pro t e ect he mainly su ers from the price increase as a consumer; for a large shareholder, however, the pro t e ect dominates the price e ect. with an increase in P k ; when = 0 :3, the cutpoint, the graph goes to the other direction from P k = 2; when = 0 :5, this large shareholder's minimal compensation decreases with an increase in P k . Note that this is only a 100-consumer economy. In a large economy, the threshold should be much smaller. The intuition behind this result is quite clear. In a large population most people will own a very small percentage of the total shares, a percentage that approximates zero. It follows from Proposition 1 that for small shareholders, whose price e ect dominates pro t e ect, their minimal individual compensation increases as the price increases. Therefore, on the aggregate level, the minimal aggregate compensation, T min , increases with an increase in the market power of sector k, k .
The Public Servant's Optimal Behavior
This section contains two main propositions of the paper the optimal choice of the Bureaucrat and the Populist. This proposition tells us that in a large population, the Bureaucrat will gain most by privatizing the public sector with the least market power and the largest subsidy rst, if all other characteristics of the public sectors are the same. By privatizing the more competitive sector, the price increase as a result of the privatization will be relatively lower. Therefore, the Bureaucrat does not need to compensate the consumers as much, so he can skim o the cream via minimizing the transfers he pays to maintain a certain percentage, d, of consumers not worse o by his policy.
As a comparison to the Bureaucrat, we study the optimal policy of the Populist. His constrained maximization problem, P1 and P2, can be converted into one of unconstrained where ij is consumer i's marginal utility with respect to product j.
The above proposition shows that holding the other characteristics of the rms in the public sector the same, if the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high relative to marginal utilities, a Populist will privatize the public sector with the least market power and the largest subsidy rst. Intuitively, when the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are not too high, the dominating e ect in the social welfare function is the sum of individuals' indirect utility functions see P3, whose magnitude increases with a decrease of the market power of the newly privatized sector due to the price e ect.
In this case, privatizing the more competitive sector is the socially most e cient w ay o f privatization. When the marginal costs of products in the private sectors are too high with respect to marginal utilities, the dominating e ect in the social welfare function is the sum of costs in the private sectors. In this case the Populist will privatize the most monopolistic sector rst, since the increase in its prices causes a decrease in the demand of other products yy , which causes a decrease in the total cost of production, and hence an increase in the total social welfare. This seemingly perverse result makes sense because the cost of production a ects the pro t of private rms, all of which goes to the consumers either as pro t shares or as compensations from the pro t tax to the state, therefore a ect the total social welfare.
From the above t wo propositions, the optimal privatization policy is quite robust to the speci cation of the politician's objectives. Under ordinary situations, exploiting the more nearly competitive pricing is a faster route to e ciency gain for either type: the one who wants to give adequate capture of e ciency gains to enough citizens at lowest possible rent transfer, and the one who wants to maximize the social welfare when the marginal costs in the existing private sectors are not too high. An interesting but probably unusual case arises when the marginal costs in the private sectors are too high relative to the marginal utilities, when the Populist gains more by privatizing the monopolistic sectors rst.
Political Institutions and the Optimal Policy
The above analysis on the Bureaucrat holds the political institution, the percentage of sup- Another important issue is entry. I f w e allow e n try into the model, it also drives down the market power of any sector, j = 1
" jh . Going back to the sequencing policy discussed in the introduction, we can see that the size of a sector is not the only factor that should be taken into consideration in the Public Servant's optimal policy. Other important factors, such as the subsidy a sector gets, the elasticity of demand of the product, and the competitiveness of a sector the latter two are included in the concept of the market power index should all be taken into consideration.
Another assumption is that all goods are non-substitutes to each other. Substitutes are grouped in the same sector. A more realistic approach w ould do away with this assumption.
Such a model would be more complicated, and we are not sure how the result would change.
In our model, the wage income of the consumers and the cost functions of rms are taken as exogenously given. Future work should be done to make these factors endogenous within the economy. Some preliminary thinking suggests that the privatization of a sector in the economy w ould lead to a total change in the supply and demand of labor, and hence the change in wage income. Therefore, for the consumers in a transition economy, both the compensation from the government and the change in their wage income will be the decisive factor in coping with price increases.
Though not exactly a model of the Chinese reform, it sheds some lights on the sequence of reform policies in price liberalization and partial privatization in China over the past decade Wang and Chern 1992. Though the political and economic situations in Eastern Europe and ex-Soviet republics are di erent from China zz , some of the schemes and sequencing considerations from the Chinese experience can still provide some practical lessons on the likely success and failure of transition toward a market economy.
Although we h a ve focused on the question of the order in which sectors would be privatized, a number of normative analyses of privatization risk limited relevance if they do not take account of the political economic factors introduced in this paper.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: by Assumption 4, so the second term is also positive.
Since the pro t in sector k can increase or decrease with an increase in the price of product k, the sign of 
